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ABSTRACT. This paper focuses on the role of policy entrepreneurs in realizing water policy transitions. 
The central questions are to what extent have policy entrepreneurs played a role in realizing major change 
in water policies, who are these policy entrepreneurs, and what strategies have they used to bring about 
change? The policy science literature suggests that policy entrepreneurs have an "arsenal" of possible 
strategies for achieving change. Based on a comparative analysis of water policy changes in 15 countries 
around the globe and the European Union, we investigate which strategies have in practice been used by 
policy entrepreneurs, to what effect, and which lessons for managing water transitions we can draw from 
this. The comparative case analysis shows that individuals play complementary roles; hence, 
entrepreneurship in water management is often collective entrepreneurship. Strategies of coalition building, 
the manipulation of decision making forums, and the strategic framing of issues and windows are crucial 
to understanding water policy change, which suggests that the management of water policy transitions is 
a highly political game. We conclude by listing recommendations for those who would like to direct water 
policy change.
Key Words: change strategies; international comparison; po licy change; po licy entrepreneurs; transition 
management; water management
INTRODUCTION
In the introduction to this special feature we 
developed a typology of strategies that policy 
entrepreneurs can potentially use to realize water 
policy transitions, which we equate with major 
changes in water policies. This article presents the 
results of 16 in-depth analyses of the role of policy 
entrepreneurs in realizing major change in national 
water policies (Huitema and Meijerink 2010). For 
each of these transitions, we assess whether or not 
radical policy change was indeed affected by 
individuals, and if  individuals did play a role, which 
strategies they have used to affect change. The 
purpose of this article is to refine the typology that 
was presented in the introduction to this special 
feature, and to explore the possibility of a more 
generic theory of change strategies. One question 
of interest then is how much do the particular 
institutional arrangements either facilitate or rule 
out different types of strategy, or can we identify 
similarities among cases that indicate where and
when certain types of policy entrepreneurs and 
strategies might be successful?
The analysis presented here goes beyond the four 
country studies presented in this special feature. In 
Huitema and Meijerink (2009a), we present 11 
additional country studies along with an analysis of 
water transitions in the European Union (EU). 
Together, these 16 accounts of major change in 
water policies provide a solid empirical basis for 
investigating the role of policy entrepreneurs in 
realizing water policy transitions. What kind of 
transitions did we observe in these 15 countries and 
the EU? We found examples of both substantive 
transitions, such as the transition from structural 
flood defense to integrated flood risk management, 
and governance transitions, such as the privatization 
of water services, decentralization, and the move to 
more participatory forms of governance. It is 
important to reiterate that our interest was in the 
adaptability of political systems. Therefore, our 
interest was in explaining the role of policy
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entrepreneurs in realizing major policy change 
irrespective of the direction of that change; hence, 
the transitions analyzed do not necessarily 
contribute to a more sustainable management of 
water resources. Table 1 gives an overview of the 
transitions analyzed in the various countries and the 
European Union.
The water transitions analyzed involve strongly 
diverging contexts, some arising in low-income 
countries, others in middle-income or high-income 
countries. Some occurred in democracies and others 
in semi-democracies or authoritarian regimes. That 
is why the most different systems approach, as 
described in the introduction to this special feature, 
can be applied. If we consistently find a connection 
between the activity of policy entrepreneurs and 
major policy change across such diverse contexts, 
this supports our hypothesis that policy 
entrepreneurs play a crucial role in realizing water 
policy transitions. In this article, we first reflect on 
the patterns of continuity and change in the various 
case studies, and the difference between the 
adoption and implementation of new policies. Next, 
we confirm that policy entrepreneurs were involved 
in all transitions analyzed here, and we discuss the 
types of policy entrepreneurs who have played a 
role in the cases studied. This leads to questions such 
as were they individuals or organizations, and to 
what extent were they able to make a difference? 
Are policy subsystems changed from within, that is, 
by governmental bureaucracies and/or elected 
politicians, or by “outsiders”, such as non­
governmental organizations (NGOs)and scientists? 
We then address the central questions of our 
research: What strategies have policy entrepreneurs 
used to realize water transitions, and have these 
strategies been successful? What strategies are used 
to block transitions, and have they been successful? 
And how does the institutional context constrain or 
enable the activities of policy entrepreneurs? We 
conclude by summarizing the main lessons learned 
from the various examples of policy entrepreneurship 
featured in the case studies, and addressing both 
potential pitfalls and possibilities for improving the 
chances for a successful navigation of water 
transitions (see also Olsson et al. 2006).
CHANGE ON PAPER VERSUS CHANGE ON 
THE GROUND
Various theories of the policy process, such as the 
advocacy coalition framework (Sabatier 1993),
punctuated-equilibrium theory (Baumgartner and 
Jones 1991), and historical institutionalism (for 
example, Pierson 2000), distinguish between major, 
radical, or paradigmatic policy change and 
incremental or shallower forms of policy change.
The countries studied all demonstrate policy 
dynamics and offer clear examples of major change 
embodied in either the content of water policies or 
in the overarching governance paradigm. One of the 
lessons from the 16 case studies, however, is that 
even though such radically new policies may have 
been adopted, they have neither replaced existing 
policies entirely nor have they been implemented 
fully. te Boekhorst et al. (2010), analyzing the 
introduction of integrated river basin management 
(IRBM) in China, conclude that “The introduction 
and implementation of IRBM as a new paradigm 
can be regarded as the emergence of resistance to 
the Chinese hydrological mission and its unintended 
consequences. However the ongoing execution of 
large hydro-engineering projects indicates a 
competition between two paradigms and an 
outcome that has still to be determined.” Ingram and 
Lejano (2009), writing on U.S. water policies, 
similarly argue that existing ways of knowing water 
are persistent even when alternative framings 
(meanings) of water issues are introduced. In 
addition, the case studies of flood management in 
Hungary (Werners et al. 2010), Germany (Becker 
2009), and the Netherlands (Huitema and Meijerink 
2009b) all demonstrate how newly adopted policies 
of ecosystem-based water management and flood 
risk management put pressure on stable policy 
communities, but in none of these cases has the 
“old” hydrologic paradigm of fighting the water by 
regulating rivers and constructing dikes disappeared 
completely. Rather, in some cases, policy 
entrepreneurs tried to integrate, combine, or balance 
the “old” engineering and “new” ecological 
approaches, while others actively attempted to 
frustrate the change in direction.
The same tension between newly adopted and 
existing policies can be observed in the case studies 
of governance transitions. Although many newly 
adopted policies emphasize the need for stakeholder 
and public participation in water management, 
many governance practices are still based on more 
traditional modes of governance. The Thai and 
Tanzanian examples show how new rules and 
procedures overlaid existing local institutions 
without replacing them and without formally 
addressing the way in which they were supposed to
Ecology and Society 15(2): 21
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol15/iss2/art21/
Table 1. Substantive and governance transitions analyzed in the case studies presented.
Country/region Transition analyzed Source
Substantive transitions
United States Transition from single purpose to integrated water resources
management
China Transition from hydraulic paradigm to ecosystem-based water
management
Thailand Transitions from:
•  diversion in wet seasons only to all year-round irrigation
•  giving priority to farming to giving priority to urban and 
industrial users
•  emphasis on consumable quantities of water to the service- 
rendering quality of water
Ingram and Lejano (2009)
te Boekhorst et al. (2010)
Lebel et al. (2009)
Australia Transitions from:
•  economic water use only to environmental water allocation
•  unregulated to regulated ground water use
Hughes and McKay (2009)
South Africa
Hungary
Spain
Germany
The Netherlands
Transition from extraction and pollution of mining water to pollution Turton (2009) 
prevention
Transition from hydraulic paradigm to ecosystem-based river 
management
Transition from supply-based water management to demand 
management
Transitions from a traditional technocratic safety discourse to an 
ecological risk perspective
Werners et al. (2010) 
Font and Subirats (2010) 
Becker (2009)
Transition from hydraulic paradigm (construction of dams and dikes) Huitema and Meijerink 
to space for the river and river restoration (2009b)
Mexico
India
Governance transitions
Privatization (creation of water markets, introduction of water Wilder (2010)
pricing), decentralization, introduction of participatory governance 
(establishment of water user associations)
Decentralization, introduction of participatory governance Narain (2009)
(establishment of water user associations)
(con'd)
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Indonesia 
Tanzania 
European Union
Turkey
Sweden
Decentralization, introduction of participatory governance 
(establishment of water user associations)
Privatization, decentralization, introduction of participatory 
governance (establishment of water user associations)
Bhat and Mollinga (2009) 
Goldin and Kibassa (2009)
Marketization (introduction principles of full cost recovery and water Partzsch (2009) 
pricing), introduction of participatory governance (public 
participation, stakeholder participation)
Privatization of water services, decentralization, introduction of Kibaroglu et al. (2009)
participatory governance (establishment of water user associations)
Transition from non-adaptive towards adaptive institutions Olsson and Galaz (2009)
interact (Goldin and Kibassa 2009, Lebel et al. 
2009). As a consequence, prior institutions persist 
and sometimes continue to dominate decision­
making processes, for example in areas where local 
irrigation organizations are still active. In other 
cases, such as in Indonesia, the management and 
maintenance of irrigation systems was formally 
decentralized, but the central government continued 
to play a crucial role in funding and monitoring, 
hence, continued to be a powerful actor in irrigation 
management (Bhat and Mollinga 2009).
These observations underscore the need to 
conceptualize policy transitions as a multiple step 
process: there is a difference between changing 
policies on paper and changing policies on the 
ground. It is well known from the literature that even 
if  formal policies change radically, implementation 
constitutes a new round in the policy game, where 
established routines are often less amenable to 
change. Several case studies illustrate this dynamic, 
since opponents of policy change have often 
successfully blocked the implementation of 
radically changed policy.
It is possible, of course, that “old” substantive and 
governance paradigms or discourses will be 
replaced entirely in the long run, but many of the 
transitions that we have studied have not yet reached 
that stage and may never reach it. Indeed, in many 
countries, such as Thailand (Lebel et al. 2009) and 
Tanzania (Goldin and Kibassa 2009), it may not be 
desirable for former practices and concepts to 
disappear completely. Integration of valuable new 
and old components might well form an element of 
a transition towards more sustainable water 
management.
PO LICY  ENTREPRENEURS 
Introduction
The authors of the case studies were asked to use an 
agency perspective, that is, to find out who is behind 
the changes observed and to focus on the roles and 
strategies of the individuals or organizations so 
identified. The various case studies provide ample 
evidence for the crucial role of key individuals and 
organizations in realizing transitions. Individual 
policy entrepreneurs stood out as agents of change 
in many cases, but it proved difficult to pinpoint 
individuals in the case studies on China, Thailand, 
South Africa, Tanzania, and the EU. In the latter 
cases, the analysis focused primarily on the roles 
and strategies of organizations. This occurred for 
various reasons. Firstly, the social science training 
of some of the authors focuses on organizations and 
collectives, leading to inexperience or even unease 
with analyzing the role of individuals and presenting 
detailed accounts of their strategic behavior. 
Secondly, some authors faced a substantive 
difficulty in that entrepreneurship is often a 
collective undertaking, where a small group of 
individuals navigates a transition, each representing 
different organizations and playing a different role. 
An additional complicating factor in identifying key 
individuals comes with “the politics of claiming 
success” . If a transition is generally perceived as 
successful, many parties and persons will claim 
responsibility for the success. Because the 
reputations of individuals and sometimes also 
powerful organizations are at stake, the claiming of 
success is a political game. Success may well be 
attributed to those most adept at playing the media. 
The contribution of those lacking the necessary 
promotional skills may be thought less important
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for a particular transition. For this reason, the case 
studies draw largely on document analysis and 
multiple interviews with individuals who played a 
key role in the transition process (methodological 
triangulation). Existing accounts of policy change, 
as available for the Netherlands for instance, proved 
instrumental in this way. The consideration of 
someone, some organization, or some group as key 
in either realizing or blocking change receives 
support when both documents and a majority of 
respondents refer to the same person, organization, 
or group, thus increasing the credibility of the 
findings.
Individual policy entrepreneurs
The observations on our cases corroborate 
Kingdon’s thesis that individual policy entrepreneurs 
can be found anywhere (Kingdon 1995), including 
within governmental bureaucracies, political 
parties, NGOs, or expert communities. These 
individuals share a common willingness to invest 
their resources (time, reputation, and/or knowledge) 
in a particular proposal for policy change and 
possess good networking skills. What is more, most 
of these entrepreneurs demonstrated considerable 
perseverance: they often worked on particular 
transitions during significant parts of their career or 
they had to make changes in their career to achieve 
the transitions they sought.
Experts within the bureaucracy and the scientific 
community have played a major role in all cases 
studied. This is not surprising given the highly 
technical nature of the water sector. Both the Dutch 
and German case studies refer explicitly to the 
potential for contribution to policy change by a “new 
guard”, which is a group with a new, different 
scientific-disciplinary background (in these cases, 
biologists and ecologists) that has managed to 
occupy crucial positions within research institutes 
and governmental bureaucracies (Becker 2009, 
Huitema and Meijerink 2009b).
Collective policy entrepreneurship
Although the cases illustrate the role of key 
individuals as change agents or obstacles to change, 
most cases also demonstrate the importance of 
groups in successfully challenging the status quo. 
Such groups often consist of representatives of 
government agencies at various levels of
government, thus creating connections among 
various scales and levels of decision-making, 
NGOs, and/or research groups. Thus, most 
entrepreneurship we found is collective. Collective 
policy entrepreneurship holds two main advantages. 
First, people in different positions may draw on a 
different arsenal of strategies to influence a change 
trajectory. Where experts working at either 
governmental research institutes or universities 
have excellent possibilities to develop and test new 
ideas and approaches, senior policy advisors or 
politicians generally are in a better position to help 
achieve the adoption of new policies. Second, 
people may have different capacities and skills 
irrespective of their positions. Some have charisma 
and are adept at explaining their vision to the media. 
Others possess skills in developing new policy 
concepts or in finding common ground with 
multiple stakeholders.
Our cases confirm that shadow networks, formed 
by actors operating on the fringes or outside the 
formal circuits of power, are important for effecting 
policy change. Huitema and Meijerink (2009b) 
show that several officials working on alternative 
approaches to water management in the Netherlands 
had to do so with only silent support from their 
superiors and eventually had to take jobs outside the 
bureaucracy. A “shadow position” achieved in this 
way gave them greater flexibility in advancing their 
ideas. Similarly, ideas about radically different 
approaches to water management were developed 
in shadow networks of academics and NGOs in 
Hungary (Werners et al. 2010), Spain (Font and 
Subirats 2010), and India (Narain 2009). Returning 
to our first observation of the importance of 
collectives in effecting transitions, we must 
conclude that shadow networks are especially 
important in the phase of idea development and, in 
several cases, also in showing the applicability of 
their ideas in principle through pilot projects. The 
actual uptake of their ideas requires interaction with 
the formal policy network and gives politicians, 
former politicians, and high-ranked bureaucrats a 
key role with their ability to translate the innovations 
into new policy. This is consistent with the finding 
of Olsson et al. (2006) that members of such shadow 
networks develop and test new ideas in the shadow 
of formal decision-making arenas but need to 
develop links to formal decision networks to 
successfully challenge a dominant policy paradigm.
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The special case of donor organizations
While entrepreneurial bureaucrats, politicians, 
experts, or representatives of NGOs may play a role 
in all countries, in low-income or middle-income 
countries they are joined by another type of policy 
entrepreneur in the form of the various international 
donor organizations. Donor organizations, such as 
the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, 
Inter-American Development Bank, and the Asian 
Development Bank, played a crucial role in shaping 
water policy transitions in Indonesia (Bhat and 
Mollinga 2009), Mexico (Wilder 2010), Tanzania 
(Goldin and Kibassa 2009), Thailand (Lebel et al.
2009), and Turkey (Kibaroglu et al. 2009). While 
offering help for the resolution of financial crises or 
capital for investment in the water sector, they also 
attach conditions on national governments. Such 
conditions often entail fundamental changes in 
governance regimes, including privatization, 
decentralization, and participatory governance (for 
example, by the establishment of water user 
associations in irrigation management). Funding 
conditions are often in line with the paradigm of 
integrated water resources management, but the 
way in which some of these elements are 
implemented varies greatly across the case studies. 
In several cases, a perversion of notions such as 
public participation and privatization can be 
observed as elites use their control over the national 
state to create advantages for themselves (see for 
example Goldin and Kibassa (2009) on the 
Tanzanian case).
TH E STRATEGIES OF POLICY 
ENTREPRENEURS
Introduction
How, then, did policy entrepreneurs realize change, 
and what strategies have they used? Strategic 
analysis always runs the risk of rationalization with 
hindsight of the actions of the players involved. That 
policy entrepreneurs were relevant in all countries 
does not necessarily mean that all transitions were 
plotted or the result of anticipatory and strategic 
behavior. Often, transitions can only be nudged, not 
managed. Policy entrepreneurs differ in their 
awareness of decision processes at different levels 
of governance and their capacity to act or intervene 
at particular levels. The Spanish change coalition 
did show such awareness, as they used the EU
venues to put pressure on the national government 
(Font and Subirats 2010). In the Hungarian case, 
however, the change agents had not developed a 
strategy to link their ideas of ecosystem-based water 
management to formal decision-making forums, 
and the adoption of their plans resulted from a more 
serendipitous process, which they did not 
necessarily completely foresee (Werners et al.
2010).
Strategies for developing and disseminating 
new ideas within multi-level governance 
networks
Our set of cases shows striking similarities in the 
ways in which water management issues are framed 
and how transitions of a similar type are being 
shaped in many countries around the globe. 
International NGOs, such as the World Wide Fund 
for Nature (WWF), have contributed to the 
dissemination of the concepts of river restoration 
and river basin management. These observations 
bring to mind the analogy made by Richardson 
(2000) between policy ideas and viruses. Just like 
viruses or memes, some policy ideas and discourses 
are contagious and spread around the globe.
However, different types of policy entrepreneurs 
have clearly used variegating sets of strategies to 
spread these ideas. Donor organizations are able to 
mandate change through the formulation of strict 
funding conditions, including demands for 
governance transitions. Organizations such as the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund 
have been particularly successful in disseminating 
the ideas of privatization and decentralization of 
water management (Gupta 2009). It is not a 
coincidence that countries such as Turkey 
(Kibaroglu et al. 2009), Mexico (Wilder 2010), 
India (Narain 2009), Tanzania (Goldin and Kibassa 
2009), and Indonesia (Bhat and Mollinga 2009) all 
present examples of efforts to privatize and 
decentralize water and irrigation policies. It may be 
argued that in these countries the national 
governments actually had little choice but to change 
their governance paradigm. It should be noted, 
however, that there are certain instances where 
government elites on the national and regional 
levels gain personal benefits, in the form of both 
influence and new job opportunities, from funding 
by international donor organizations (for example, 
Goldin and Kibassa 2009).
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Various case studies lead to serious questions 
regarding the effectiveness or even appropriateness 
of externally and centrally enforced forms of top- 
down transitions. The Tanzanian case study serves 
as an interesting example of how colonists in the 
past introduced a new system of water management 
that destroyed much of the adaptive capacity 
embedded in local and tribal networks (Goldin and 
Kibassa 2009). Cynics might argue that this 
colonialism is not over yet because the studies of 
transitions in India (Narain 2009), Indonesia (Bhat 
and Mollinga 2009), Mexico (Wilder 2010), and 
Tanzania (Goldin and Kibassa 2009), and of EU 
external water policies (Partzsch 2009) demonstrate 
how western countries continue to implement their 
western-developed models of “good governance” 
in a non-western context. Indeed, various 
international water and governance discourses 
reveal a general pattern of the uploading of ideas 
developed in the western world to the international 
level and their subsequent downloading in other 
parts of the world (Gupta 2009).
The strategy that donor organizations use to 
influence national water policies is entirely different 
from the strategies that most other policy 
entrepreneurs, possessing different resources to 
influence decision-making processes, tend to use. 
What these policy entrepreneurs have in common 
with donor organizations is that they carry a 
particular set of ideas, whether it is a belief in the 
merits of water markets, water pricing, participatory 
governance, or ecosystem-based river management, 
and undertake efforts to get these ideas realized. 
However, whereas donor organizations are in a 
position to impose policy change through the 
formulation of conditions to funding, most other 
policy entrepreneurs need to gain attention for and 
attract supporters to their ideas first. Small-scale 
pilot projects are often used to demonstrate the 
feasibility and benefits of their newly proposed 
approaches. Examples include the Bokartisz 
coalition of municipalities and pilot sites for 
floodplain rehabilitation in the Bodrogkoz area in 
Hungary (Werners et al. 2010), WWF and wetland 
restoration in Dongting Lake in China (te Boekhorst 
et al. 2010), and the authors of the Plan Stork and 
nature development along the Dutch main rivers 
(Huitema and Meijerink 2009b). Policy entrepreneurs 
in these cases used the media to communicate the 
results of such projects, to disseminate their ideas, 
and to change people’s perceptions and mental 
models (Olsson and Galaz 2009).
Almost all transitions suffer from implementation 
problems, which are usually caused by a 
conservative bureaucracy that wants to maintain the 
status quo. The transitions instigated from the 
international level encounter problems in “scaling 
down”. Especially when they are meant to empower 
local parties, water user associations, etc., they will 
be treated with hostility by the bureaucracy. There 
is a qualitative difference between transitions 
towards privatization and transitions towards 
decentralization and river restoration. The latter 
types of transitions tend to run into greater 
implementation problems (Indonesia, India, 
Hungary are cases in point) than the first (see the 
description of transitions in Mexico (Wilder 2010) 
and Tanzania (Goldin and Kibassa 2009). This 
difference may have something to do with the fact 
that privatization is more easily implemented in a 
way that is beneficial to the ruling elite.
Whether or not implementation difficulties can be 
overcome depends on political support from top 
leaders and from the institutional environment these 
leaders operate in. In both the Chinese and Indian 
transitions, support from high political leaders was 
present and important for creating changes on the 
workshop floor level (Narain 2009, te Boekhorst et 
al. 2010), but the Chinese institutional structure is 
more centralized and thus offers greater chance of 
actual implementation once such support is 
guaranteed. It should be noted, however, that even 
under the most favorable conditions, most policy 
changes remain “partial transitions” in the sense that 
old and new policies tend to coexist in most 
countries. In this respect, it is interesting to note how 
many recent ideas for river restoration and 
institutional design are inspired by ancient ways of 
water management that are still practiced in niches 
(take the Hungarian, Dutch, German, and Thai 
examples). Under the “hydraulic mission” of 
canalization, damming, etc., such ways were often 
more or less forgotten or moved to the fringe, but 
they have recently regained prominence as more 
sustainable water management approaches.
Building coalitions: balancing between 
advocacy and brokerage
This brings us to the strategies for gaining support 
for new ideas and building successful coalitions and 
alliances. In the country studies, we see three types 
of coalitions. First, a coalition can be made up of 
those who share the same or very similar ideas,
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beliefs, and values. They share either a common 
disciplinary background, that is, they may be part 
of an epistemic community, or they share certain 
ideas, beliefs, and convictions unrelated to any 
particular discipline. Typical examples include 
environmentalist or pro-development coalitions, 
which we, for example, have seen in the Netherlands 
case study. The primary activity of such a coalition 
is advocacy of a particular set of ideas, as in the 
Netherlands case, ideas of ecosystem-based and 
greener water policies. Premised on a stance at once 
ontological and epistemological, similarities in 
belief systems or shared meanings, are found to be 
the binding element of these coalitions.
A second type of coalition, which elsewhere we 
have called a strategic alliance (Meijerink 2005), is 
a coalition between parties who do not share the 
same policy beliefs, value preferences, or world 
views; nevertheless, they share an interest in 
realizing a particular sort of policy change. Partzsch 
(2009), in her account of the development of the EU 
Water Framework Directive, describes how the 
water industry and environmental NGOs joined 
forces because they shared an interest in water 
pricing, although for entirely different reasons. 
Whereas the drinking water companies hoped to 
benefit financially from this governance transition, 
the environmentalists wanted to ameliorate surface 
water quality and to restore water ecosystems. The 
Netherlands case quite similarly shows how a 
coalition of fishermen, who tried to safeguard their 
income, and environmentalists, who wanted to 
preserve the estuarine ecosystem, formed a 
successful alliance that opposed plans to close an 
estuary (Huitema and Meijerink 2009b). Finally, 
Font and Subirats (2010) show how economists, 
environmentalists, and (water) donor regions, each 
with different beliefs, interests, and ways of 
knowing water, jointly opposed the traditional 
supply-based engineering approach in Spain.
A third type of coalition includes parties who neither 
share beliefs or problem perceptions nor policy 
preferences but are simply dependent on each other 
for realizing their diverging objectives. Policy 
transition is incidental to the successful 
achievement of the separate goals of the coalition 
members. While shared beliefs or meanings and 
shared policy objectives form the glue that binds 
advocacy coalitions and strategic alliances, 
respectively, resource dependence forms the 
rationale behind this third coalition type. Successful 
change agents clearly have an eye for the
preferences and desires of other parties and try to 
meet their demands, winning support for their 
proposals in the process. For example, WWF 
managed to gain support for ecosystem restoration 
projects in China by addressing the economic needs 
of the local population at the same time (te 
Boekhorst et al. 2010). Coalition building among 
parties with different value priorities and policy 
objectives often entails processes of negotiation and 
compromise, similar to the formation of a coalition 
government in a multi-party system. Successful 
policy entrepreneurs, therefore, have to balance 
continuously on the continuum between advocacy 
and brokerage (Kingdon 1995). On the one hand, 
they must be good advocates of specific concepts. 
They need to be able to communicate their ideas and 
message in an appealing and convincing way. On 
the other hand, they need the skills to negotiate and 
cooperate with those who have different ideas, 
world views, or interests but who possess crucial 
resources. Expanding on our finding that successful 
entrepreneurship is often collective entrepreneurship, 
the cases presented show that different persons may 
play complementary roles: while some may excel 
in generating new ideas, others are particularly 
skilled in advocating those ideas, and still others 
have the capacity to broker or negotiate.
Policy entrepreneurs can also benefit by 
understanding the importance of building networks 
across different “ways of knowing” water (Ingram 
and Lejano 2009). Boundary organizations or key 
individuals can play a crucial role in connecting 
various ways in which water issues are framed, 
thereby inserting new values and perspectives. For 
example, Olsson and Galaz (2009), in their Sweden 
case study, explain how a key individual managed 
to change the perception of politicians from seeing 
wetlands as a problem (“water sick”) to seeing them 
as a valuable resource (“water rich”). The policy 
entrepreneur in question did so by developing and 
applying landscape-level solutions to environmental 
problems, solutions originated by networks, and by 
linking proposals to additional goals such as 
regional development. Where Ingram and Lejano 
point to the usefulness of brokering between (or 
connecting) various ways of knowing, Narain 
(2009) and Lebel et al. (2009) insightfully show how 
discursive strategies may also be used strategically 
by both advocates of change and those who try to 
block it. Such discursive strategies can be used to 
attract supporters to new policy proposals and to 
justify policy interventions. Lebel et al. (2009) 
distinguish between various powerful framings,
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such as the “drought narrative”, the “forests make 
water narrative”, and the “living with the river 
narrative” . In their study of policy change in the 
Upper Ping Basin, they found that adherence to such 
narratives formed a key strategy for individuals 
wishing to promote and secure policy changes. 
Players in the transition would, for example, try to 
fit new policy ideas into existing narratives, or 
conversely, appeal to such narratives to oppose 
change. Their analysis also demonstrates how the 
very same narrative used to promote one particular 
water transition can be used as a counter-narrative 
to block another water transition.
Anticipating, m anipulating, and exploiting 
windows of opportunity
Coalition building and shared meaning making, 
however, are not sufficient for realizing change. 
Policy entrepreneurs need opportunities to launch 
their ideas. The case studies repeatedly illustrate the 
importance of windows of opportunity in water 
policy transitions. Table 2 gives an overview of 
some of the key windows that were found to be of 
relevance in the case studies.
Several examples exist of policy entrepreneurs who 
successfully exploited crises. Media coverage of 
environmental emergencies, like sea or river floods, 
periods of extreme drought, or cases of accidental 
pollution, raises public awareness, thus increasing 
political attention to specific water problems. Both 
public and political attention to an issue offers 
opportunities for policy entrepreneurs to gain 
support for new insights, policy proposals, and 
policy directions. The river floods in Hungary 
(1998, 2001), Germany (2002), Thailand (2005), 
and China (1998), and the sea (1953) and river 
floods (1993 and 1995) in the Netherlands all 
offered windows of opportunity to launch or 
articulate ideas of ecosystem-based water 
management and of creating more space for the 
water.
As can be easily appreciated from the literature 
(Birkland 1997, Boin et al. 2009), the framing of 
such flood events is a crucial strategy here. In the 
Netherlands case, the river floods mentioned above 
could either be framed as a sign that insufficient 
resources had been allocated for realizing and 
maintaining structural flood defenses or as a sign 
that the policy paradigm of controlling the water 
with technical infrastructure had failed. The (near)
river floods of 1993 and 1995 and the resulting 
large-scale evacuation of residents dramatically 
increased awareness of water issues and policy. 
Although new plans for creating more space for the 
river had been developed in the early 1990s, the 
floods actually threatened to reinforce former 
policies. The Ministry of Traffic and Water 
Management, with strong support from the Dutch 
parliament, was very determined to make rapid 
improvements to the weaker points in the dykes, 
even if this meant sacrificing attractive landscapes. 
Alternative ideas received relatively short shrift as 
Parliament adopted emergency legislation that 
allowed for quick and centralized decision-making 
(Huitema and Meijerink 2009b). The proponents of 
a greener approach to water management had to 
operate very carefully in this situation because their 
ideas could easily have been thrown aside. By 
cautiously linking their ideas to the public’s desire 
for safety and ensuring that their approach would 
not be eliminated from official policy documents, 
they were able to prevent the pendulum froom 
swinging back to earlier policy models.
Other examples of such “framing contests” (Boin 
et al. 2009) can be found in the case studies on 
Thailand and Hungary. In the Hungarian case study, 
the framing contest centered on the causality of the 
river floods (Werners et al. 2010): “The cyanide 
spill and Bereg flood occurred as parties were 
campaigning for the 2002 elections. Whereas the 
water authority supported a hard engineering 
approach, Bokartisz was advocating its new ideas. 
The engineering approach was criticized by the 
NGOs and individual scientists for adding to the 
flood risk and causing unwanted side-effects in the 
region.” The case studies of strategic framing of 
disasters show that policy entrepreneurs engaged in 
a framing contest over the causality of such disasters 
and the desirability of specific policy options but 
did not turn to the framing of disasters as lapses of 
leadership by responsible authorities. This may be 
explained partly by their dependence on the 
responsible authorities for achieving change. 
Rather, the policy entrepreneurs saw problem 
windows primarily as opportunities to launch their 
policy alternatives, to stress the merits of those 
alternatives, and to position themselves better to 
think in line with and cooperate with policy-makers. 
The development and marketing of attractive policy 
alternatives that take into account the interests of 
many stakeholders have taken precedence as the 
strategy employed by policy entrepreneurs who are 
presented with windows of opportunity.
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Table 2. Windows of opportunity arising in the cases studied. 
A. Problem windows
Country Problem window analyzed
Mexico Asian financial crisis
China Yangtze River flood 1998
Thailand Financial crisis 1997-98 
Upper Ping River flood 2005
Indonesia Financial crisis 1997-98 
Severe drought caused by El Niño
Australia Severe drought 1990s
Hungary Tisza River flood 1998, 2001, and 2006 
Cyanide spill Tisza River 2000
Turkey Economic crisis of the 1980s
Germany Rhine River flood 1993 and 1995 
Elbe and Donau River floods 2002
The Netherlands Sea flood 1953(Near) Rhine river floods 1993 and 1995 
Extreme rainfall 1996 and 1998
B. Political windows
Country Political window analyzed
United States Appointment of Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt 1993
Mexico Regime change 1990s
Thailand Regime changes 1991, 1997, and 2006
Indonesia Regime change 1998
South Africa Regime change 1994
Hungary Elections 2002 and 2006
Spain Elections 1996 and 2004
Turkey Political crisis of the 1980s
The Netherlands Elections 1973
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In all cases of river floods analyzed, the new 
policies, which were adopted afterwards, had been 
developed and implemented on a small scale before 
the focusing event took place. In the Netherlands, 
the regional “Plan Stork” preceded the adoption of 
the generic “space for the river” policies (Huitema 
and Meijerink 2009b; the Hungarian “Bokartisz 
coalition” had gained experience with floodplain 
restoration in the Bodrogkoz area before this 
approach was adopted at the national level (Werners 
et al. 2010); and in Germany, floodplain restoration 
in Baden-Wuerttemberg and flood risk management 
in Rhineland-Palatinate were later taken up at the 
national level (Becker 2009). These occurrences fit 
perfectly with Kingdon’s multiple streams model, 
in which policy alternatives in circulation can be 
attached to new problem definitions when a window 
opens (Kingdon 1995). They also underscore 
Olsson et al.’s (2006) argument that systems need 
to be prepared in readiness for change.
Several case studies point to the relevance of crises 
outside the realm of nature or even the water 
management subsystem. Examples include the 
Asian financial crisis (Bhat and Mollinga 2009, 
Lebel et al. 2009) or the economic crisis in Turkey 
(Kibaroglu et al. 2009). Where floods or natural 
disasters offered opportunities to garner active 
assistance and encouragement for substantive 
policy changes, exploitation of financial and 
economic crises aimed primarily to realize change 
in water governance, most notably toward 
privatization and decentralization.
Political windows also have a role to play in most 
of the case studies. Such windows range from those 
created by regime change, as in the case studies of 
South Africa (Turton 2009), Indonesia (Bhat and 
Mollinga 2009), Mexico (Wilder 2010), and 
Thailand (Lebel et al. 2009), to the change of an 
elected government or a single minister, as in the 
election of the Den Uyl administration in the 
Netherlands in 1973 (Huitema and Meijerink 
2009b), the appointment of the Indonesian pro­
reform President Abdurrachmann Wahid (Bhat and 
Mollinga 2009), or of Secretary of the Interior Bruce 
Babbitt in the United States (Ingram and Lejano 
2009). Some researchers characterize contemporary 
society as postmodern and typified by new modes 
of governance and forms of deliberative democracy 
that are taking over the central role of traditional 
party politics. Many case studies, however, 
demonstrate the crucial importance of traditional 
party politics, general elections, and changes of
national governments as factors in water policy 
transitions. The case study on hydro-politics in 
Spain offers a clear example: while the 
conservatives insisted on traditional supply-based 
solutions to the issue of water shortages, the socialist 
party demanded more sustainable alternatives (Font 
and Subirats 2010). This is not to say that politics 
is the main driver of change; in most cases it is not. 
Political changes, however, can offer opportunities 
to gain attention for new ideas and to secure a place 
for new issues on the political agenda.
Connecting inform al to form al networks: the 
exploitation, m anipulation, and creation of 
venues
The transitions analyzed in countries as different as 
Indonesia, China, Mexico, and the Netherlands all 
feature examples of actors who deliberately 
manipulated the composition of advisory or 
decision-making forums. In the China case study, 
the WWF managed to gain a seat in an influential 
national task force on river basin management (te 
Boekhorst et al. 2010); a minister in Indonesia 
purposefully moved a specific department from one 
ministry to another in order to minimize the 
influence of the conservative old guard (Bhat and 
Mollinga 2009); in Mexico, an environmental 
minister engineered the transfer of the national 
water commission from the Agriculture and 
Fisheries Ministry to the new Ministry of the 
Environment and Natural Resources (Wilder 2010); 
and in the Netherlands, decision-making on the 
Eastern Scheldt storm surge barrier saw the 
government deliberately install an interdisciplinary 
advisory commission, thereby breaking the 
monopoly of the influential Rijkswaterstaat 
engineers (Huitema and Meijerink 2009b). Those 
who engage in venue manipulation aim to have their 
own ideas or their coalition represented where 
policy-relevant issues are discussed and to bypass 
those who resist the change proposed.
Venue shopping has also proven to be an effective 
strategy in several cases. The Spanish case study, 
for instance, shows how a coalition of parties 
seeking support for alternatives to traditional 
supply-based engineering solutions played the 
various EU venues successfully; this strategy 
increased pressure on the Spanish national 
government to change the planned policy program 
(Font and Subirats 2010). The need to link various 
scales and levels of government is noted by most
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authors. For local initiatives to be scaled up, they 
need to be linked to policy arenas on a higher level.
Finally, policy entrepreneurs may deliberately 
create new forums to bring people together, often 
to discuss problems, as seen for example in the U. 
S. case (Ingram and Lejano 2009), and in the 
dialogues on water policy in Indonesia that were 
organized by international organizations and the 
Ford Foundation (Bhat and Mollinga 2009). The 
Tanzania case shows that such forums, even if 
formally adhering to participatory principles, can 
be rigged to produce biases towards certain policy 
innovations like the privatization of water services 
(Goldin and Kibassa 2009).
C rafting institutions for learning or for 
realizing particu lar policy ideas?
Policy entrepreneurs operate within a particular 
institutional setting but may also try to change that 
setting. Bureaucratic entrepreneurs in particular 
often have numerous opportunities to change the 
design of decision-making processes. This raises 
questions such as how open or closed is the policy 
process? Is the policy process organized as blueprint 
planning or as a social learning process? In theory, 
bureaucratic change agents may not always direct 
change deliberately in one direction but instead 
purposefully craft institutions that offer opportunities 
for learning, for instance by stimulating a variety of 
problem definitions and the development of a 
variety of policy options.
Olsson and Galaz (2009), referring to Ostrom 
(2005), argue that unicentric, simple, large-scale 
governance units do not, and cannot, have the 
variety of response capabilities that polycentric, 
multi-level governance systems can have. 
Awareness of which institutional settings are more 
conducive than others to learning may help policy 
entrepreneurs create a “learning environment” that 
allows for variation and experimentation. From a 
normative point of view, we fully agree with the 
need for creating institutions that encourage variety 
and provide spaces for (social) learning. However, 
the case studies show a discrepancy between this 
normative ideal and the reality where entrepreneurs 
seem to be more interested in institutionalizing their 
new policy ideas or ”way of knowing”, that is in 
discursive closure (a fixation of meaning), than in 
creating a learning environment. Take the various
examples of pilot projects, which sometimes have 
an experimental and testing element but more often 
are intended to sell a new approach to the public. 
Likewise, the existence of multiple venues does not 
seem to function primarily as an incentive for 
variety and learning; it is probably more realistic to 
conceive of venues as arenas where entrepreneurs 
try to win (parts of) the multi-level policy game. Put 
otherwise, the policy entrepreneurs that we have 
studied were more interested in getting their ideas 
accepted and institutionalized than in learning. To 
that end they tried to gain access to major decision­
making forums, to manipulate forums, and to frame 
crises strategically, to build strategic alliances to 
pool resources, and they strategically used 
narratives to attract supporters. This arsenal of 
strategies shows that successful policy entrepreneurs 
have played a very political game to institutionalize 
their policy ideas. Since those in power can afford 
not to learn, a newly established policy monopoly 
often is just as stable as the one that was disrupted 
or replaced, thus ironically creating barriers to 
future change (Baumgartner and Jones 1991). 
However, if a newly established policy monopoly 
displays more characteristics of being sustainable 
than the disrupted one, we may well want it to be 
stable.
Although we are aware that our findings on the 
highly political character of entrepreneurial action 
should be explained partly by the specific 
conceptual lens (a policy science perspective) that 
we have used in our study of water policy 
transitions, they may be valuable additions to 
insights produced by studies of transitions that have 
used other theories or ‘lenses’, such as theories of 
social learning and adaptive management.
Strategies to block change
Most of the country analyses related the story of 
change agents and their strategies, yet some case 
studies present interesting insights into players with 
an interest in maintaining the status quo and how 
they can try to block change (Kibaroglu et al. 2009). 
Most of the strategies discussed above have also 
been used to block change and maintain the status 
quo. Those resisting change tried to disseminate 
their ideas, to build coalitions, and to control the 
various decision-making forums. Narrative strategies, 
too, found eager users in the no-change camps 
(Lebel et al. 2009).
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As discussed above, defenders of the status quo or 
those trying to divert new policy can be particularly 
successful in the implementation stage. Narain 
(2009), Bhat and Mollinga (2009), and Goldin and 
Kibassa (2009) all refer to the work of Thomas and 
Grindle (1990) on policy implementation, which 
maintains that donor organizations have invested 
many resources in strengthening policy analysis and 
in developing models of “good governance” but 
have neglected implementation. Narain (2009) 
describes how the street-level bureaucracy of an 
irrigation department in India feared the loss of 
opportunity to extract illicit payments from farmers 
for releasing water. They either withdrew support 
for management turnover or tried to delay the 
rehabilitation of projects. Large and powerful 
farmers who benefited from the status quo, for 
example, threatened policy entrepreneurs using 
letters and blackmail. Key stakeholders in the South 
African mining industry also used an armory of 
strategies to block policy change. According to 
Turton (2009), they had learned how to 
outmaneuver government attempts to regulate the 
industry. Tactics included destroying evidence of 
liability and/or culpability, attacks on the credibility 
of scientists, and provision of inadequate budgets 
for public participation processes. The case studies 
seem to show that proponents of policy change 
typically do not employ underhanded strategies. 
Those vested in extant policy have recourse to 
actions made possible by the advantages of power 
and/or possession, such as bureaucratic delay and 
obstruction.
HOW  INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT 
M ATTERS
Policy entrepreneurs around the world appear to use 
quite similar strategies of coalition-building, 
exploitation of problem or political windows, and 
venue manipulation and venue shopping. This does 
not mean that institutional differences are not 
relevant to water policy transitions. The case studies 
show that they do, in fact, affect the potential to 
achieve a policy transition and for a transition to 
endure. Different countries clearly offer individual 
or collective entrepreneurs different opportunities 
(opportunity structures) to achieve their goals (see 
for example Baumgartner et al. 2009). While in 
some countries advocates of change may feel 
frustrated as they encounter an institutional void and 
a lack of opportunity to articulate ideas, those 
advocating change in other countries may complain
about institutional complexity. Both an absence and 
an abundance of institutions are often said to 
constrain the ability of policy entrepreneurs to bring 
about a policy transition.
At the same time, these individual institutional 
contexts each offer a particular opportunity 
structure. Complex decision-making processes in 
which many different parties and levels of 
government are involved usually feature a wide 
range of venues where change agents may place 
their issues on the agenda or seek support for their 
ideas. As Richardson has argued elsewhere, 
alternative venues form an important resource for 
interest groups (Richardson 2000). Becker (2009), 
in his study on transitions in German flood 
management, also correlates multiple venues with 
policy entrepreneur opportunity. He argues that the 
German federal state structure, precisely because it 
offers a large number of venues for simultaneous 
discussion of similar issues, acts as fertile ground 
for the development of new policy approaches. As 
Lebel et al. (2009) in a similar vein conclude, the 
studies overall seem to show that an increase in 
institutional complexity and redundancy is not 
dysfunctional. It rather provides alternative 
platforms for deliberation and policy influence at 
multiple levels. More centralized and less 
democratic government systems, however, offer 
other opportunities. Once policy entrepreneurs have 
managed to gain access to and support from the 
central decision-makers, they may be quite effective 
in realizing policy change in such systems (see te 
Boekhorst et al. 2010 on China).
The state organization of some countries might 
receive criticism for various normative reasons, but 
in terms of change management, critiquing is far 
less important than knowing a particular system 
well and using strategies that fit within the 
institutional context. In some cases, however, 
institutions can be very constraining, thereby 
minimizing chances for entrepreneurial action. 
Turton (2009) argues that in most of South African 
history, there was no space for individual policy 
entrepreneurs. It took the end of the apartheid 
regime for possibilities to arise for individual policy 
entrepreneurs to make a difference in the 
management of mining water.
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CONCLUSIONS AND PO SSIBILITIES FO R  
TRANSITION M ANAGEM ENT
We provide Table 3 as a summary of the main 
conclusions of our case study research. The patterns 
of continuity and change in water management 
show that all transitions exhibit remnants of former 
regimes or discourses, and it is clear that a major 
policy change does not guarantee successful 
implementation (findings 1 and 2).
Some findings of the case studies strongly 
corroborate the policy science literature. Findings 
on characteristics of policy entrepreneurs (3), on the 
use of advocacy and brokerage strategies (6), and 
on the need to anticipate windows (9) are in 
alignment with Kingdon’s multiple streams model 
(Kingdon 1995). Finding 9 supports the argument 
of Olsson et al. (2006) that systems need to be 
prepared for change. Baumgartner and Jones’s 
(1991) concepts of venue manipulation and venue 
shopping have been very useful for understanding 
change agents’ strategic behavior (finding 10); the 
same is true of their conclusion that newly 
institutionalized policies (new policy monopolies) 
can be just as stable as the ones replaced. Indeed, 
policy entrepreneurs usually try to institutionalize 
their world view, and as a result, set barriers in place 
to future change (finding 11).
Other insights, such as the importance of collective 
entrepreneurship (finding 4), the need for context- 
dependent balancing between top-down and 
bottom-up strategies (finding 5), the usefulness of 
network-building across different ways of knowing 
water (finding 7), and the possibilities for strategic 
use of narratives (finding 8), were derived from the 
case study material more inductively.
As mentioned above, there are similarities but also 
some notable differences between low-income, 
middle-income, and high-income countries when it 
comes to identifying policy entrepreneurs and their 
strategies. In low- and middle- income countries, 
donor organizations are important policy 
entrepreneurs. They have succeeded in changing 
governance paradigms almost overnight in many 
cases, but implementation following such change 
tells a different story (finding 2). The 
implementation of major policy change appears to 
be a challenge in all cases studied, which fits well 
with principal findings of other research on policy 
implementation (for example, Pressman and 
Wildawsky 1973; Thomas and Grindle 1990).
Our final finding pinpoints the need for policy 
entrepreneurs to adjust their strategies to the 
particular institutional context in which they are 
operating. Different institutional contexts produce 
not only different institutional constraints but also 
different opportunity structures. Change agents 
need to be able to recognize and exploit the 
opportunities and peculiarities of a particular 
institutional system (finding 12).
What are the implications of these findings for those 
who aim to direct change? The in-depth case studies 
on the roles and strategies of policy entrepreneurs 
have contributed to our knowledge about the 
complexity of change trajectories. With this 
knowledge, a policy entrepreneur may be able to 
turn a “trained eye” on newly developing change 
processes, to evaluate and interpret them, and to 
recognize opportunities for change and their 
characteristics. Examination of policy transitions 
must account for their intrinsically dynamic nature. 
“The experience of managing in complex adaptive 
systems is more similar to catching waves or looking 
for emergent corridors for action than pulling strings 
or working levers” (Westley 2002, p. 354). A simple 
list of “do’s and don’ts” would not do justice to the 
case analyses. Nevertheless, we cannot resist the 
temptation to formulate some general recommendations 
for those who seek to direct policy change:
1. Develop a thorough knowledge of the 
characteristics and peculiarities of the 
relevant institutional system. This step is 
necessary to be able to recognize and 
characterize opportunities and to assess the 
likely effectiveness of specific change 
strategies.
2. Persevere and be willing to spend resources, 
especially time, to see a transition process 
through to implementation.
3. Attract supporters to the policy alternatives 
and build coalitions. Strike a balance between 
advocacy and brokerage strategies. Negotiation 
and compromise can be as important as 
communication of the new ideas.
4. Recognize the various ways of knowing 
water. Frame the problem and develop the 
narrative strategy around those that fit the 
institutional and social context.
5. Anticipate windows of opportunity, whether
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Table 3. Findings on water policy transitions, policy entrepreneurs, and change strategies: lessons learned.
On patterns of change
1 New policy ideas (paradigms, discourses, or ways of knowing) do not replace the “old” ones, rather they are 
placed alongside them or are integrated with them.
2 After new policies have been adopted, those who have an interest in maintaining the status quo have ample 
opportunities to delay or frustrate policy implementation.
On policy entrepreneurs
3 Policy entrepreneurs can be found anywhere, but what they have in common is a good reputation within their 
respective communities, good networking skills, and perseverance.
4 Successful entrepreneurship often is collective entrepreneurship in which individuals play complementary roles.
On strategies (and institutions)
5 A combination of bottom-up and top-down strategies makes most transitions happen, and their relative importance 
depends largely on the particular institutional context or opportunity structure.
6 Successful (individual or collective) entrepreneurs are able to balance advocacy and brokerage strategies.
7 Successful policy entrepreneurs build networks across different ways of knowing water (different meanings).
8 Successful policy entrepreneurs use narratives to frame issues strategically and thereby justify change and attract 
supporters.
9 Successful policy entrepreneurs anticipate windows of opportunity by developing and testing attractive policy 
alternatives and demonstrating their feasibility.
10 Successful policy entrepreneurs employ strategies of venue manipulation and venue-shopping, and/or create new 
venues to be able to insert new ideas into decision-making processes.
11 Successful policy entrepreneurs manage to institutionalize new ideas (discourses, images, or ways of knowing), 
and in this way create barriers to future change.
12 Successful policy entrepreneurs have a full and thorough knowledge of the institutional system they are working 
in and know how to use that system.
they are opened by shock events or by 
political changes. Be prepared to exploit these 
opportunities and to insert the new ideas into 
the political debate. Pilot projects are useful 
for demonstrating feasibility but should not 
exclude experimentation and testing.
6. Play a political game. Issues or disasters need 
to be framed strategically. Forums may 
require manipulation, and forum-shopping 
can be necessary in order to bypass change 
blockers.
RESEA RCH AGENDA
We hope that additional effort will take the research 
past the limits of this case study research. A useful 
next step would be a systematic test of one or more 
hypotheses on the strategies used by policy 
entrepreneurs. All findings, as summarized in Table
3, can also be read as hypotheses that need further 
testing and refinement in a broader range of cases. 
A most different systems approach, as we have 
applied in this comparative case analysis, has 
proven useful in testing a causal relationship across
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various contexts, and may be used in a similar vein 
for further testing of more specific causal 
relationships, such as between a specific change 
strategy (for example, the framing of policy 
windows) and policy change. A complementary 
approach would be a most similar systems approach 
that aims at explaining different outcomes (in our 
case, either major policy change or stability) within 
very similar systems (Anckar 2008).
We see three research topics as particularly fruitful: 
the nature of coalitions and the art of coalition- 
building, the interaction between agency and 
windows of opportunity, and change strategies in 
low- and middle-income countries. In terms of 
framing the research, a great deal of conceptual 
work needs to be done in the policy sciences.
In this article we have made an analytical distinction 
between three types of coalitions: those based on 
shared world views or meanings, those formed 
around shared policy preferences (strategic 
alliances), and those centered on resource 
dependencies. But how do policy entrepreneurs 
choose which of these types to build, and when, and 
by using which strategies? We have seen, for 
example, how policy entrepreneurs may try to 
bridge and relate multiple ways of knowing water 
(meanings), which is an example of policy 
brokering. However, they may also use narrative 
strategies for advocacy and to attract supporters. 
How do entrepreneurs balance advocacy and 
brokerage strategies? What makes them select a 
particular strategy or a combination of strategies? 
These kinds of questions go beyond an explanatory 
typology of strategies related to policy transition 
and could further guide the work of policy 
entrepreneurs.
Policy entrepreneurs need opportunities in the form 
of problem and political windows to get their new 
policy ideas and plans accepted and realized. We 
have learned that both anticipating windows and the 
framing or “painting” of windows can be effective 
strategies. The cases show, however, that usually it 
is a combination or a series of windows that 
produces a real opening for change. More research 
is needed on how policy entrepreneurs exploit 
windows of opportunity that open simultaneously 
or successively.
One of the striking observations in the case studies 
is the failure of implementation in most water policy 
transitions in low- and middle-income countries.
Donor agencies, such as the World Bank, face huge 
difficulties in implementing new governance 
models, such as the concept of water user 
associations. The burning question, then, is whether 
more practical alternatives can be developed. Which 
policies fit better with the institutional 
characteristics of these societies? Would it be more 
fruitful to build on existing institutional capacity 
rather than assuming the need for a new institution 
to take on the task of implementation? Would a 
leave-alone strategy be effective? Case-by-case 
responses to such questions might lead to more 
successful implementation.
Confusion and overlap are rife in regard to concepts 
in the policy science literature. In our research we 
have grouped concepts that show considerable 
overlap, such as the concepts of frames, narratives, 
and ways of knowing. This rough grouping of 
theories and concepts works for our analysis but 
clearly entails an interesting theoretical research 
agenda. How do these concepts relate to each other, 
how exactly do they differ, and when do these 
differences prove useful? This kind of conceptual 
research would help to develop a theory on (the 
management of) water policy transitions.
We very much hope that the case analyses, the 
findings, and research agenda will stimulate others 
to further investigate the strategies of policy 
entrepreneurs in realizing water policy transitions. 
In this way we also hope to be of some help to those 
engaged in bringing about improvements that are so 
urgently needed globally in fresh water 
management.
Responses to this article can be read online at:
http://www.ecologvandsocietv.org/vol15/iss2/art21/
responses/
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